FAU philosopher receives funding from the DFG’s Heisenberg program
It is commonly accepted that we have to justify our intentional actions. But does the same apply to beliefs and emotions? This is the question considered by Dr. Christian Kietzmann, philosopher at Friedrich-Alexander-Universität Erlangen-Nürnberg (FAU), with particular reference to the action theory of the British philosopher and Wittgenstein’s student Elizabeth Anscombe. His project entitled “Responsibility beyond intentional action”, in which he also intends incorporating previously unpublished works by Anscombe, has received funding from the German Research Foundation (DFG) as a Heisenberg position within the framework of the Heisenberg program.
Mr. Kietzmann, what do you mean when you talk about “responsibility beyond intentional action”?
First, I understand “responsibility” as meaning that we hold each other accountable from a moral point of view, for instance through accusations or emotions such as resentment or outrage. Clearly, we do so in the event of action that someone takes intentionally and that we believe is morally questionable. However, we also do so in cases not involving intentional actions, for instance a failure to act in a certain way. Think, for instance, of a night watchman who falls asleep during his shift and therefore fails to prevent a break-in. The fact that the night watchman did not do his rounds as required is a culpable omission that we can rightly accuse him of. Accusations, resentment and outrage are also appropriate in response to certain beliefs and emotions even though these are also not something we do intentionally.
Can you explain that in more detail?
Let’s look at beliefs. We evaluate beliefs on the basis of epistemic norms – that is, norms regulating the acquisition of knowledge – and moral norms – and criticize, praise or reprimand each other accordingly. We then say something along the lines of “How can you believe such nonsense?” or “that is sexist and degrading, you shouldn’t believe something like that!” In other words, we hold each other to account for the epistemic and moral quality of what we believe – not necessarily in the legal sense, but all the more in the sense of social sanctions. The decisive question is therefore: Do we actually have any degree of control over what we are being held accountable for? To what extent are we responsible for our emotions and beliefs? The practice of holding each other accountable can only make sense in the context of matters we actually have control over. It is not only unfair but also makes no sense to reproach people for something they cannot influence.
Does that mean we should restrict responsibility to intentional actions?
Some philosophers have made suggestions along these lines, but that would mean making a massive change to current practice. Other approaches involve assigning willful control to beliefs and emotions and thereby treating them like intentional actions. In my opinion, this is ruled out on conceptual grounds alone. I am trying to develop a new concept for controlling beliefs and to transfer this to emotions and conclusions as well. In particular, I would like to further develop the thoughts of the British philosopher Elizabeth Anscombe, a student of Ludwig Wittgenstein. Her book Intention published in 1957 is considered a modern classic in the field of action theory. Over the last decade, Anscombe’s work has experienced a renaissance of sorts.
How does Anscombe’s work tie in with your project?
According to Anscombe, intentional action has a number of characteristic features. First, we know directly what we ourselves do with intention – in contrast to what others do, as we only find out about that through observation or through asking. Furthermore, as a rule, we can give a reason for our actions that shows what we consider the benefit of this action to be. And often before taking action we consider how we can reach a certain goal – and perhaps also which goals are worth striving after. All these aspects are found in a similar form for beliefs: We know directly what we believe, as a rule we can give reasons why what we believe appears to be true, and through our thoughts we can derive new beliefs from those we have already. My idea is now that these characteristics in both cases – when taking action and in our beliefs – form the essence of what we can sensibly understand having control to mean.
Apart from Intention, do you base your research on any other of Anscombe’s works?
In a series of texts, Anscombe pondered accountability, nature and the normativity of beliefs and conclusions. One of the aims of my work will be to conduct an exegetical exploration of these thoughts. My main objective is to merge comments scattered over her work into a uniform picture and fill systematic gaps in a way that makes sense. In addition, part of Ascombe’s academic estate that is kept at the University of Pennsylvania in Philadelphia has not yet been published. During a research stay, I would like to view the relevant manuscripts and prepare several texts for a publication. I am extremely grateful that the DFG will support my project over the next five years.
Contact:
Dr. Christian Kietzmann
Chair of Practical Philosophy
christian.kietzmann@fau.de